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4 DEC 1959

Memorandum of Conversation

SUBJECT: Discussion of CLW as related to Agency
Military Reserve Training Program
(Inactive Duty Training)

MEETING: CIA, Joint Planning Committee, Military Reserve Unit
Chairman - Lt. Col. [REDACTED]
Guest Speaker - Lt. Col. [REDACTED]
Date - 30 November 1959

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REFERENCES: a. CLW Concept Paper
b. HB [REDACTED] Pers. Eng./Mob. Planning Guide and
c/nemo Dir/Pers. re "Screening of Agency Category I
Reservists"
c. Address by Col. White, Gen. Mtg., CIA Military
Reserve Unit - September 1959

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BACKGROUND: In conformance with the HD/P's request for improving the Agency's manpower operational capabilities to cope with CLW (ref. a) situations, as the interested PF/PMD Staff Officer in this regard, I was invited to discuss this subject with the above Committee. The recent address by Col. White, (ref. c) before the Agency's Military Reserve Unit contained proposals to the effect that the Agency's Reserve training program should undertake to provide training for CLW type operations. Reference b. provides criteria guidance for training as related to mobilization assignment. The PF/C/PMD advised, after consultation with the appropriate CIA officers, that it would be better at this time to seek interpretations within the existing mission of the Agency Reserve Program for CLW training without taking action to change the mission as proposed by Colonel White (ref. c).

DISCUSSION: After introduction by the Chairman, I explained that apropos of Colonel White's address, I desired to discuss CLW with the Committee to determine whether it would be feasible to re-examine the Agency's Military Reserve Training Program in order to provide more substantive training in CLW subjects. When

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it was ascertained that only one or two members were acquainted with the CLW concept, I attempted very briefly to describe it and volunteered to make copies available later for their individual study.

In order to make clear CLW training could be interpreted within the existing mission of the CIA unit, it was pointed out during the discussion that the language - "to perform intelligence and related activities in a military capacity in wartime", provided sufficient range of subjects; and, in fact, anything taught at Holabird, Fort Bragg or the Pentagon's Strategic Intelligence School, would be legitimate subjects for the Agency's program. These military schools teach psychological operations, guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and other subjects directly related to the requirements of CLW training. Moreover, the word "wartime", in absence of a qualifying adjective, also means limited wars or any military situation involving U.S. Armed Forces.

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It was generally agreed CLW subjects could be and, in fact, were being partially taught in the present program. Though the latter was acknowledged, I endeavored to reiterate the point that, perhaps, this training could be more substantive in content. It was mentioned, this training was not intended to substitute for OTR's efforts, but, rather to supplement regular Agency training. Most of the officers who would receive this training during their inactive training period, would have no other opportunity for receiving it, as they were either in RHI, IBS, or in unrelated positions in HEP. A few officers have availed themselves of the opportunity for active duty training at [REDACTED]

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The point was raised regarding mobilization assignments. Aside from being assigned to the Agency in wartime, what, in fact, was required in terms of training for such assignments? With reference to in mind and the UN war planning which the Agency has been engaged in for several years, I made mention of the recent UN/PTX of the 10th Special Forces in Europe and how we would be expected to function in wartime and how important it would be to have Reserve Officers trained in such operations. This UN training for wartime would also be the kind of training in basic skills which would be needed in certain CLW situations.

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The discussion indicated a need for a more specific explanation of what was meant by "more substantive training in CLW subjects". I pointed out examples of how we treated many complex subjects concerning basic skills or tradescraft with only one hour of reading material and an hour for discussion, whereas, to acquire any grasp of the subject, several or many training periods should be devoted to the subject. In this way, depth would be obtained in the subjects which most directly concern the Agency's wartime responsibilities for military personnel and, hence, an improvement in CLW capability. To illustrate this point, I asked the Chairman to re-read the training outline for the three-year training cycle which he did. Without meaning to be factious, I remarked that it read like the syllabus of the National War College. I inquired whether this was not the problem, were we attempting to cover subjects on too high a level without providing adequate training in the fundamentals which we were concerned with as Agency Reserve Officers? There were only about thirty-two training periods a year and if all the subjects were so weighty that they could only be treated generally then the results would most likely be very superficial.

As a matter of completeness, it should be noted that, while most officers present concurred in the remark about the syllabus being similar to the National War College's, one officer took umbrage at my remark as unwarranted criticism of their training program. His point was to the effect that the Agency's military requirements was far broader than "just paramilitary" and therefore, the high level approach with certain treatment of special paramilitary subjects was very sound. In my response, I endeavored to point out that CLW operations were only one-third paramilitary at most, the balance concerned the various intelligence, counterintelligence and psychological and political actions involved in a tightly integrated operation. The Chairman, however, assured me that there was room within the training program for providing more substantive training in the basic CLW subjects and that an effort would be made to do so. I assured the Chairman and the Committee that there were ample training materials available on these subjects including films. The following examples were cited off-hand as not being in the program and as having CLW value:

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COMMENTS:

If one is to seek more meaningful training in subjects more directly concerning the Agency's responsibilities and attempts to identify wherein this may be accomplished, such comments may be considered as criticism of the existing program. While the objective of this discussion was to improve the training in CIM subjects by devoting more time to the fundamentals involved, in essence, this concerns an appeal to re-orient the training from general, high level subjects to more specific and expensive treatment of the basics involved in the established mission - CIM notwithstanding. In the absence of clear understanding of what would be the nature of Agency Reserve Officers mobilization assignment in wartime the broad training approach may be justified as it covers the spectrum of the Agency's interests and activities. If, however, a more substantive approach is to be considered in CIM/IN matters, either the spectrum must be refracted accordingly or portions eliminated.

Prepared by: _____

Lt. Col. USAR
FP/POB

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